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Ahern: Change in the Age of Majority on Prior Divorce Decrees

THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE IN THE AGE OF
MAJORITY ON PRIOR DIVORCE DECREES
PROVIDING FOR CHILD SUPPORT
INTRODUCTION

FFECTIVE JANUARY 1,

1974, the legal age of majority for both men and

women in Ohio was changed from 21 to 18.1 Although the statutory
change was not unexpected (Ohio having ratified the 26th amendment to
the United States Constitution on June 30, 19712) the General Assembly
has seemingly left to the courts the issue as to the effect that the new
age of majority will have on the termination of child support obligations
under prior divorce decrees.
The jurisdiction of a domestic relations court to enforce child
support orders is largely dependent on the source from which the order
gains its strength. Support orders that incorporate an agreement of the
parents retain vitality in Ohio and in a number of other states at least3
until the agreement dictates the support obligation should terminate,
4
absent a change of circumstances. The effect of the change of the age
of majority on such orders involves the construction of the termination
provisions of the incorporated agreement. The major difficulty under
such child support orders is that the termination provisions are often
provided in terms relating to infancy. Other incorporated agreements
provide no termination provision at all or do so only tangentially by
dictating that the obligation is for a "minor" child.
Where the court-ordered support is not based on an agreement of the
parents, the jurisdiction of the domestic relations court to enforce
the order extends no further than the parental duty of child support
5
imposed by law. The parents have assumed no greater obligation. The
parent
REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.01 (Page Supp. 1973). The statutory duty of a
beyond minority where
to support his child was also amended to extend the obligation
is in full-time attendance at an accredited high school. OHIo REV. CODE
'OHIO

the child

ANN. § 3103.03 (Page Supp. 1973).

CoNsT. amend. XXVI, § 1 provides: "The right of citizens of the United
States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of age."
3Through the incorporation of their child support agreement into the divorce decree,
parents can assume an enforceable obligation that is greater than the obligation
imposed by law. For a summarization of case law supporting this proposition see
2U.S.

223 N.W.2d 400, 407-08 (1974);
In re Trust Between LaBelle . ..... Minn .......
Washburn, Post-Majority Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMPLE L.Q. 319, 337-38

(1971) [hereinafter cited as Washburn]. But see Fellows v. Fellows, 267 So. 2d 572
(La. App. 1972).

Support orders are modifiable because of a change of circumstances whether the
order is based on a separation agreement incorporated into a divorce decree or not.
4

See H. CLARu, LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 15.2 at 498 (1968).
5 The statutes defining the obligation of parents to support their children have

generally been interpreted as limiting the court's jurisdiction to order, on its own,
post-majority support. See Washburn, supra note 3, at 329-32.
[338]
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lowering of the age of majority has limited this duty of support imposed
by law to age 18 with limited exceptions. 6 Court orders providing for child
support beyond age 18, entered prior to the effective date of the statutory
change and not based on an agreement of the parents, may, therefore,
become unenforceable because of a lack of jurisdiction. The ousting of jurisdiction to enforce such orders raises the issue of whether such an operation
of the statutes impairs vested rights towards unaccrued support payments.
The purpose of this article is to consider the effect of the statutory
change in the age of majority on the construction and enforcement of
support orders entered prior to the effective date of the new statutory
age. The goal is to provide the domestic relations practitioner with a
shorthand guide as to how these issues have been decided in Ohio and in
other states and, finally, to provide an analysis of these decisions.
EARLY PRECEDENT

In Ohio, the age of majority has been changed by statute three times.
The General Assembly modified the common law age of 21 years 7 in 1834
to 18 years for women (while leaving the age for men at 21),8 only to
change the statutory age back to 21 for both men and women in 1923. 9
The 1923 legislation reflected similar changes in other states.' 0
The effect of the change of the statutory age from 18 to 21 for
women on prior divorce decrees ordering child support was confronted
directly in reported decisions of four states." The decisions divided along
two lines, one represented by the state of Washington in Springstun
v. Springstun.2 and the other represented by the California decision of
Rosher v. Superior Court.'3
In Springstun v. Springstun, the state of Washington approached the
issue of the effect of the statutory change of the age of majority on
the child support provisions of prior divorce decrees in terms of the life
of the particular decree entered prior to the legislative enactment. The
5 Ohio requires parental support for adult children who are attending an accredited
high school full time. OHIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page Supp. 1973). Other
states require post-majority support for education, or to prevent an indigent child from
becoming dependent on the state for support. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 19
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); Washburn, supra note 3, at 341-42 (which contains a
compilation of state family responsibility laws).
7 Prior to this first statutory modification of the age of majority, both men and women
reached the age of majority at 21 in Ohio under the common law. Slater v. Cave,
3 Ohio St. 80 (1853); McClintock v. Chamberlin, Wright's Reports 547 (1834).
8 Lawof February 3, 1834, 32 Laws of Ohio 10.
9 Law of April 5, 1923, 110 Laws of Ohio 125.
10 5 C. VERNIER, AMIucAN FAMELY LAWS § 271 (1938).

11 Rosher v. Rosher, 9 Cal. 2d 556, 71 P.2d 918 (1937); Kendall v. Kendall, 122
Cal. App. 397, 10 P.2d 131 (1932); Irby v. Martin, 500 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1972); State
ex rel Weingart v. Kiessenbeck, 167 Or. 25, 114 P.2d 147 (1941); Springstun v.
Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 229 P. 14 (1924).
12 Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 113, 229 P. 14, 16 (1924).
13 Rosher v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 556, 71 P.2d 918 (1937).
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question before the court was whether the particular decree, providing for
support "during the minority"'14 of the daughter of the parties, could be
enforced beyond the age of majority existing at the time of the order.15
Although the court recognized the general continuing duty of parents
to provide support for children for three more years irrespective of the prior
decrees,' the court held that the decree itself did not retain vitality beyond
17
the child's reaching 18 years of age. It had expired, and the further
obligation of father to support until she reached 21 years of age would
18
require enforcement, not under the decree, but in a separate proceeding.
The court declared that the power of the state legislature was limited
in its effect on prior judgments:
We need not argue, we think, that the legislature is without power
to set aside, annul, or change the liability upon a judgment affecting
solely the rights of private parties by the enactment of a general law. It
may possibly, after entry, change the rule of procedure for enforcing
judgments, such as the manner of issuing execution, conducting
power to
sales, making redemption, and the like, but it is without
9
affect the substantive rights of -theparties to a judgment.1
The Supreme Court of Washington recognized the creation of substantive
rights under a judgment requiring child support, even though such
20
judgments were subject to modification under the continuing jurisdiction
2
of the court. '
California rejected the Springstun decision expressly in Rosher v.
Superior Court.22 The California Supreme Court determined that the

statutory increase in the age of majority for women did not constitute a
prohibited retrospective application of a statute impairing vested rights.
The statute was held not retrospective, in that it applied prospectively only
2
to extend support obligations. 3 It was held not to affect vested rights, in
that the court's authority to modify support orders prevents them from
24
operating as final judgments from which such rights could be created.
24 Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 110, 229 P. 14, 15 (1924).
15 WASH.REM. COMP. STAT. § 10548.

18 Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 112, 229 P. 14, 16 (1924).
17 Id. at 113, 229 P. at 16.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See Harris v. Harris, 71 Wash. 307, 128 P. 673 (1912); Poland v. Poland, 63 Wash.

597, 116 P. 2 (1911).
21 For a discussion of the Springstun decision in terms of the most recent change of
the age of majority see Comment, Citizenship for Eighteen Year Olds-Age oj
Majority in Washington, 47 WASH. L. REv. 367, 371 (1972).
22Rosher v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 556, 559, 71 P.2d 918, 920 (1937).
23 Id. at 559, 71 P.2d at 919.
24 Id. at 560, 71 P.2d at 920. The Rosher decision overruled a prior California appellate
court decision which had supported the Springstun position on vested rights. See
Rosher v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 556, 561, 71 P.2d 918, 921 (1937), rev'g Kendall
v. Kendall, 122 Cal. App. 397, 10 P.2d 131 (1932).
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The final rejection of Springstun in the Rosher decision was found
in the construction of the support order itself. Springstun concerned a
decree calling for the support of a daughter during her minority. 25 In
Rosher the original decree provided for child support during minority,2
but the decree was modified prior to the statutory change to provide
support "until further order of the Court. ' '2 7 Springstun held that the
word minority should be interpreted in light of the statutory age at
the time of the decree. 28 Rosher held that employment of the word minority
reflected the possibility of the legislature's employing its power to change
the statutory age, and, therefore, the new age should govern.29
THE NEW AGE OF

MAJORITY: CHILD SUPPORT

CONFLICTS AMONG THE STATES

Almost every American jurisdiction has recently enacted a statutory
change in the age of majority to 18.30 At least 12 states anticipated the
controversy over the application of such statutes by providing for savings
clauses to accompany their enactment.31 The breadth of the protections
25

See text accompanying note 14 supra.
Rosher v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 556, 559, 71 P.2d 918,919 (1937).
27Id.
2
8See Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 113, 229 P. 14 16 (1924), wherein
it is stated:
The language of the decree is that the appellant shall make the monthly
payments "during the minority" of the daughter. The statute then in existence
limited minority to the time the minor reached the age of 18 years. Seemingly,
therefore, the decree is as definite and certain in that respect as it would have
been had the decree expressly named the 18th year of the minor as the date
of its expiration.
29
Rosher v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 556, 560, 561, 71 P.2d 918, 920 (1937). Oregon
has supported the Rosher position as to vested rights but added another reason for its
construction of the word "minority." See State ex rel. Weingart v. Kiessenbeck, 167
Or. 25, 39, 114 P.2d 147, 152 (1941) wherein it is stated: "The paramount concern
of the court is not with the defendant, not with the plaintiff. The decree should be
liberally construed in the interest of the child, whose nurture and education during
minority is of concern to the state." See also, In re Trust Under Will of Davidson,
223 Minn. 268, 26 N.W.2d 223 (1947) (where minority was also construed to mean
whatever the legislature says it should mean).
3
oSee Arnoff, What Lawyers Should Know About the New Age of Majority, 46 OHIO
BAR 1551 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Arnoff]. Not all of the statutory changes have
expressly related, however, to the parental duty of child support. For a consideration
of the difficulties encountered in regard to the Massachusetts change of age compare
Stewart v. Stewart, 85 N.M. 637, 515 P.2d 641 (1973), with Hamann, Eighteen: The
New Age of Majority in Massachusetts,59 MAss. L.Q. 17 (1974).
31 CAL. CIV. CODE § 25.1 (West Supp. 1974): CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-le (Cum.
Supp. 1974); 58 Delaware Laws ch. 439 § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 743.07 (Cum. Supp.
28

1974); GA. CODE ANN.

§ 74-104.1

(1973):

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.54

(Cum. Supp. 1973): Maryland Acts 1973, ch. 651 § 51; 1974 Laws of New York,
ch. 920 § 1; Oregon Laws 1973, ch. 827 § 84; R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-12-2 (Supp.
1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1974); Wyoming Laws 1973, ch. 213
§ 4. For decisions construing the effect of these savings statutes see In re Marriage of
Lungstrom .......
Cal. App. 3d .......
115 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1974); In re Marriage of
Phillips, 39 Cal. App. 3d 723, 114 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1974); In re Marriage of Atwell,
39 Cal. App. 3d 383, 114 Cal. Rptr. 324 (1974); Vicino v. Vicino, 30 Conn. Sup. 49,
298 A.2d 241 (Super. Ct. 1972); White v. White, 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. App. 1974);
Finn v. Finn, 294 So. 2d 57 (Fla. App. 1974); Dougherty v. Dougherty, 293 So. 2d
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provided, with respect to events occurring prior to the effective date of the
new statutory age in these savings statutes, differs. California has enacted
a savings statute that retains the prior definition of the word "minority"
32
and similar words relating to infancy prior to a stated date. Unlike the
does not even
statute
savings
California statute, however, the Rhode Island
limits itself
statute
Island
Rhode
The
question.
support
child
the
consider
33
solely to the application of the statute of limitations.
Unfortunately, the General Assembly of Ohio and the legislatures of
most states did not take heed of the admonition of the Ohio General
Assembly by Mr. Harry Lewis Deibel in 1923 for its failure to enact a
savings statute to accompany the statutory change of the age of majority
34
from 18 to 21 for women. The natural result of this failure has been to
33
leave the issue to the courts. This has understandably led to uncertainty
36
its age of majority in 1965, and the
modified
Kentucky
and litigation.
limited issue of the effect of the statutory change on the parental duty to
provide child support (whether by divorce decree, support agreement, or
otherwise) has been litigated in its highest court seven times, the latest
decision having been rendered in 1973, eight years after the enactment of
the statutory change. As of this writing, there have been reported
decisions on the effect of the change in the age of majority on child
support orders entered prior to the legislative change in at least 18 states
37
including Ohio. The states that have considered the question without
the intervention of a savings statute are a valuable source of precedent
for analysis. Ohio has yet to consider the issue at either the appellate
or supreme court level.
394 (Fla. App. 1974); Choquette v. Choquette . ..... Ga. ....... 208 S.E.2d 848 (Ga.
1974); Monticello v. Monticello, 271 Md. 168, 315 A.2d 520 (1974); Barbier v.

Barbier, 45 Mich. App. 402, 206 N.W.2d 464 (1973).

32 CAL. Cirv. CODE § 25.1 (West Supp. 1974). The California statute, however, does

not expressly answer whether the word "emancipation" includes emancipation by
change of law through the lowering of the age of majority. Under a recent California
Court of Appeals decision, the savings statute is circumvented by having included
within the order a provision for termination upon emancipation. See In re Marriage
of Phillips, 39 Cal. App. 3d 723, 727-28, 114 Cal. Rptr. 362, 364 (1974).

33 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-12-2 (Supp. 1973).
34 Deibel, Legal Age of Women-Effect of the New Law, 21 Ohio L.R. 215, 216
(1923) wherein it is stated:
Why the Legislature failed to append a simple proviso exemping [sic] said class
[women aged 18, 19, and 20 when the law went into effect] no man will presume

3

to divine. It-strikes one as if such old fashioned things as reason, foresight, and
wisdom, take a back seat when the up-to-date legislator breezes in. Certainly, he
is a marvelous conjurer of laws and human rights. His fecund necromancy is
the modem wonder of the world. A New York editor has been so charitable
as to ascribe this phenomenon to mental aberration.

5 See Arnoff, supra note 30.

36 KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.015 (1971).

3 The states that have litigated the issue with reported decisions are: Arizona,

California, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Vermont,
Virginia, and Washington.
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The major litigated issue in the states with reported decisions
considering the effect of a change in the statutory age of majority has been
the impact of the change on support agreements that have been incorporated in divorce decrees. The majority of these jurisdictions will recognize
and enforce an agreement incorporated into the divorce decree, showing
a clear and express agreement for child support beyond the new statutory
age.38 The same result has occurred even in those jurisdictions with
statutes which have been interpreted as limiting the jurisdiction of the
court to order child support only during the minority of the child. 39
There is conflict, however, where the incorporation agreement
provides for the termination of the child support obligation upon
emancipation. In some states the provision for termination of child
support upon emancipation has been construed to allow for emancipation
by the state through a statutory enactment lowering the age of majority. 40
The same approach was rejected in Virginia where the state supreme
court determined that emancipation by law through the change in the age
of majority was not contemplated by the parties. 4' The court employed
contract concepts to construe the intent of the parties-the most vital being
that the laws in force at the time of the execution of the contract become
part of the contract as if they were incorporated within its provisions.43
The contract approach to incorporated agreements, however, is not
fully unanimous, at least, when the controlling issue becomes whether the
court will apply the law existing at the time of the agreement to construe
the provisions of the decree. There is direct conflict as to the construction
and effect of incorporated agreements that provide for termination of
the support obligation when the child reaches majority or where the
agreement refers to the termination of the support obligation only in
an indirect manner through reference to the support obligation as
being for the minor child or the like.
The state of Kentucky adopted the contract approach in Wilcox
43
v. Wilcox,
holding that an incorporated agreement calling for support
s See note 3 supra.
39 See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1966); Mason v. Mason, 84 N.M. 720.

507 P.2d 781 (1973) (dictum); Istnick v. Istnick, 37 Ohio Misc. 91, 307 N.E.2d 922
(Stark County C.P. 1973); Jones v. Jones, 503 S.W.3d 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
4

OSee In re Marriage of Phillips, 39 Cal. App. 3d 723, 114 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1974);
Shoal v. Shoal, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972); Mason v. Mason, 84 N.M.
720, 507 P.2d 781 (1973); Garey v. Garey, 482 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1972).
4
1Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 653, 203 S.E.2d 123, 125-26 (1974). See also Shoal
v. Shoal, 14 N.C. App. 231, 188 S.E.2d 19 (1972), rev'd, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d
299 (1972), where a North Carolina Court of Appeals accepted similar reasoning only
to be reversed on appeal. Cf. Sproston v. Sproston, 8 Wash. App. 218, 505 P.2d
479 (1973).
42 Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 653, 203 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1974).
43
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1966).
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until the child of the parties "reached the age of majority or became
self-supporting"4 should be construed in view of the law at the time
the parties entered the agreement." Once the state adopted this rule
for construction of divorce decrees and independently existing support
agreements, a series of Kentucky Court of Appeals' decisions followed,
imposing child support obligations until 21 wherever words of infancy
47
for "infant
"for the infant boy,"
such as "surviving minor son,"
4
obligation
extended
children"" were employed in the agreement. Such an
related
directly
provision
any
lacked
agreement
the
where
was found even
to when the child support obligation would terminate.
In Rice v. Rice," Kansas rejected the rationale of Wilcox. That state
will enforce an incorporated agreement beyond the age of majority of the
child only where the agreement clearly expresses an intent to assume a
5°
greater obligation than that imposed on the parent by law. The result
of such a requirement has necessarily resolved all ambiguity in favor of
a termination of the support obligation upon the extinguishment of any
duty imposed by law. Under such analysis an incorporated agreement
calling for child support "until each child reaches his majority or until
51
further order of the court," and entered when the age of majority was
21, will not 'be enforced beyond the new statutory age of 18. The
subsequent amendment of the age of majority thereby controls the
52
construction of the terms. Where the incorporated agreement is entirely
silent and thereby lacking a showing of any intent to assume a greater
support obligation than that imposed by law, even Kentucky has held
that the support obligation under the court order ends upon attainment
of the new statutory age.53
1d.
l at 153.
45 Id. For decisions in other states requiring child support until age 21 where the
incorporated agreement provided for termination of support in terms of words relating
to infancy see Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 110 Ariz. 326, 518 P.2d 576 (1974) (agreement
calling for support until emancipated by marriage, majority, or death); Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 21 IlM.App. 3d 1022, 316 N.E.2d 207 (1974) (agreement calling for
support of minor children); Mason v. Mason, 84 N.M. 720, 507 P.2d 781, 783 (1973)
(dictum) (where the New Mexico Supreme Court stated it agreed with the Wilcox
decision).
48 Kirchner v. Kirchner, 465 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Ky. 1971) (separation agreement).
4t Worrel v. Worrell, 489 S.W.2d 817, 818 (Ky. 1973) (separation agreement).
4
8Showalter v. Showalter, 497 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Ky. 1973) (decree incorporating a
separation agreement).
4Rice v. Rice, 518 P.2d 477 (Kan. 1974).
5Old. at 481 wherein it is stated: "[W]here a greater liability for child support than
that prescribed by law is sought to be imposed pursuant to contract, such intent must
be clearly expressed in the contract."
51 Id. at 479.
52 For further support of this position see Jungjohann v. Jungjohann, 516 P.2d 904
(Kan. 1973); Shoaf v. Shoal, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E. 2d 299 (1972); Istnick v. Istnick,
37 Ohio Misc. 91, 307 N.E. 2d 922 (1973). Compare Whitt v. Whitt, 490 S.W.2d 159
(Tenn. 1973), with Jones v. Jones, 503 S.W.2d 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973).
53Blackard v. Blackard, 426 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1968) (where the incorporated agreement provided for child support until further order of the court).
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DIVORCE DECREES ABSENT AN AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
The jurisdiction of domestic relations courts to order child support
beyond the age of majority, absent an agreement of the parents, is usually
determined by local statute and the duty imposed upon a parent to support
his child under local law.54 In Ohio and in other states this duty has been
stated in terms of supporting the child during his minority and under
limited circumstances beyond.55 Consequently, the lowering of the
statutory age of majority at least restricts the jurisdiction of domestic
relations courts to order, on their own and after the effective date
of the change, child support beyond age 18. The unresolved issue is
whether decrees entered prior to the statutory change are unenforceable
because of a lack of jurisdiction.
The states that have confronted this issue have done so in terms of
whether the parties to such decrees acquire any vested rights in their
provisions. Only two Illinois appellate courts6 and the Supreme Court
of Washington 5 7 have held that the parties do gain a vested right under
court-ordered support towards unaccrued payments. The decisions have
so held even though there were existing statutes 58 granting the court
continued jurisdiction to modify support orders. The decision in Washington, Baker v. Baker,"9 rests on a long-standing precedent in that state
which began with the Springstun decision. The appellate court decisions
in Illinois have yet to be approved by the Illinois Supreme Court.
The best articulated decisions relating to vested rights in prior divorce
decrees are the Washington decisions. That state has determined that once
the obligations of the parents for the support of their minor children have
been determined under a court order subject to modification because of
changing circumstances, the decree is final and vested as to future support
payments. It is subject only to modification by the court and remains
unaffected by a subsequent change in the age of majority 'by legislative
act.60 Rights in the judgment became fixed upon the entry of the decree
H. CLARK, LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 15.1 at 495 (1968).
55 See note 6 supra.
56Strum v. Strum, 22 Il. App. 3d 147, 317 N.E.2d 59, 62 (1974); Waldron v.
Waldron, 13 111.
App. 3d 964, 301 N.E.2d 167 (1973).
5
7Baker v. Baker, 80 Wash. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972); Keen v. Goodwin, 28
Wash. 2d 332, 182 P.2d 697 (1947); Springstun v. Springstun, 131 Wash. 109, 229
P. 14 (1924). See also Waymire v. Waymire, 10 Wash. App. 262, 517 P.2d 219
(1974); Sproston v. Sproston, 8 Wash. App. 218, 505 P.2d 479 (1973).
58 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.08.110 (1961) (repealed 1st Ex. Sess. 1973, ch. 157, § 30). The repeal of the
Washington statute was a prelude to major divorce law reform in Washington. See
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.010-.290 (Supp. 1973); Rieke, The Dissolution Act
of 1973: From Status to Contract? 49 WASH. L. REv. 375 (1974).
59 Baker v. Baker, 80 Wash. 2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972).
60 See text accompanying note 19 supra. See also Keen v. Goodwin, 28 Wash. 2d
332, 334, 182 P.2d 697, 699 (1947) wherein it was stated:
The most compelling reason for holding that the Federal statute [Act of June
23, 1942, c. 443, 56 Stat. 381] did not supersede the court's decree, is that no
54 See
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and enforceable beyond the new age of majority even though Washington
beyond
recognized that the court was without power to order child support
6
the statutory age existent at the time the order was rendered. '
In Baker the Supreme Court of Washington determined the issue in
terms of the most recent change in the age of majority in 1971.62 The court
held that the state recognizes a presumption that all acts are only
prospective in operation and that the rights under the decree are final as
63
to any subsequent act of the legislature. Therefore the court declared that
a support order calling for support until age 2164 would be enforced until
that age even though the decree was not based on an agreement of the
parties and the age of majority was 18 at the time of the requested enforcement. The appellate courts of that state have required enforcement until
age 21 of similarly based decrees which call for support under their terms
"until the children reach their majority or are sooner self-supporting," 65
or "until the child concerned shall have reached 21 years of6 age, marries,
becomes emancipated, or until further Order of the Court."
7
In Phelps v. Phelps6 the Supreme Court of New Mexico rejected the
of support created any vested rights as to
decree
contention that a court
payments accruing after the effective date of a change in the age of
majority. 68 The court, quoting the Rosher decision and employing its
reasoning,6 9 held that a prior judgment calling for support "until each
child becomes 21 years of age, or marries or otherwise becomes
emancipated" 70 operates only in terms of the statutory age of majority. As
the jurisdiction of the court to order support in New Mexico is limited by
statute,7l the subsequent change of the age of majority can oust the court
of jurisdiction to enforce previous orders of support beyond the new

law passed by state or Federal lawmaking bodies, can set aside, nullify, or

modify a court's judgment. Appellant had a vested right in the decree allowing
her... support money, and no power could take it from her, except the reserved
right of the court to modify, as provided by state law in force at the time the
decree was entered.

61 Baker v. Baker, 80 Wash. 2d 736, 742, 498 P.2d 315, 319 (1972); Sutherland v.

Sutherland, 77 Wash. 2d 6, 8, 459 P.2d 397, 398 (1969). The jurisdiction of the court
to order support has since been extended. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.170 (Supp.
1973); In re Marriage of Melville, 11 Wash. App. 879, 526 P.2d 1228 (1974).
6
2WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.28.010 (Supp. 1973).
63 Baker v. Baker, 80 Wash. 2d 736, 741,498 P.2d 315, 318 (1972).
64 Id. at 739, 498 P.2d at 318.
65
Waymire v. Waymire, 10 Wash. App. 262, 263, 517 P.2d 219,220 (1973).
66 Sproston v. Sproston, 8 Wash. App. 218, 505 P.2d 479, 480 (1973).
67 Phelps v. Phelps, 85 N.M. 62, 509 P.2d 254 (1973).
68 Id. at 66, 509 P.2d at 258.
69 Id.

70 Phelps v. Phelps, 85 N.M. 62, 64, 509 P.2d 254, 256 (1973).
71 The statute creating the power for the court to order child support was limited to
orders for maintenance and custody for minor children. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-6
(1953).
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statutory age. 72 It also emancipates persons having attained the new
statutory age. 73 The New Mexico decision represents the prevalent view
of the few reported opinions, that there are no vested rights created
towards unaccrued payments in a decree ordering child support. 74
CHILD SUPPORT DECREES IN OHIO

The State of Ohio has yet to consider the question of the continued
vitality of prior support decrees beyond the new statutory age of majority
in a reported decision in either its appellate courts or supreme court. A
decision in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas 75 has outlined a
general rule to be followed as to the effect of the statutory change on
such prior decrees. The decision, however, is primarily dictum. 76
Under Ohio precedent 77 if the statutory change is given full effect,
domestic relations courts will be ousted of jurisdiction to enforce decrees
entered without an agreement of the parents beyond the new age of
majority unless the child is in full-time attendance at an accredited high
school.78 The duration of the child support obligation of parents as
established by law, 79 has been interpreted as limiting the powers of the
domestic relations courts to order support, 80 regardless of the child's
needs."' Any rights created under such decrees are also limited by the
fact that Ohio, 82 as elsewhere,8 recognizes that support orders are subject
to modification because of a change in circumstances.
The court's ability to modify such orders forced the Rosher court to
determine that such judgments could not operate to create vested rights
towards unaccrued payments.84 The State of Washington, however, while
recognizing that such orders are subject to modification, has held that they
72

Phelps v. Phelps, 85 N.M. 62,65, 509 P.2d 254, 257 (1973).

73

id.

74

See Lookout v. Lookout, 526 P.2d 1405 (Okla. App. 1974); Beaudry v. Beaudry,
132 Vt. 53, 312 A.2d 922 (1973).
75 Istnick v. Istnick, 37 Ohio Misc. 91, 307 N.E.2d 922 (Stark County C.P. 1973).
76 The only issue before the court was whether an agreement between the parties
incorporated into a divorce decree and calling for child support until age 21 would
retain its vitality in view of a subsequent lowering of the age of majority. Istnick v.
Istnick, 37 Ohio Misc. 91, 92, 307 N.E.2d 922, 923 (Stark County C.P. 1973).
77 Miller v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 530, 97 N.E.2d 213 (1951); Beilstein v. Beilstein, 31
Ohio Op. 116, 61 N.E.2d 620 (Ct. App. 1945).
78
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Page Supp. 1973).
79 Id.

80 Miller v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 530,97 N.E.2d 213 (1951).
81 See Beilstein v. Beilstein, 31 Ohio Op. 116, 61 N.E.2d 620 (Ct. App. 1945). For a
criticism of this limitation see H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS § 15.1 at 495

(1968).
82 Peters v. Peters, 14 Ohio St. 2d 268, 237 N.E.2d 902 (1968); Byrd v. Byrd, 20 Ohio
App. 2d 183, 252 N.E.2d 644 (1969); Rutter v. Rutter, 24 Ohio Misc. 7, 261 N.E.2d
202 (Tuscarawas County C.P. 1970).
83
See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
84 See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
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create a vested right in the ordered payments subject only to modification
because of a change of circumstances and not by a subsequent legislative
enactment.85 Any decision concerning vested rights under such decrees
will necessarily require a choice between the analysis of the issue as offered
in Rosher and in Springstun. Ohio has yet to make that choice.
In Ohio, as in other states, the initial defense as to any modification
of the support obligation through the enactment of a subsequent statute
will be made in terms of local savings statutes. Although the Ohio General
Assembly did not enact a savings statute to accompany the recent
amendments to Ohio Revised Code Sections 3109.01 and 3103.03 (which
provide the statutory definitions of majority and the parental duty of child
support respectively), there are two Ohio savings statutes which may
resolve the effect of the statutory change on prior support orders. Ohio
Revised Code Section 1.48 provides that "[a] statute is presumed to
8
be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective."
Section 1.58 limits the effect of the reenactment, amendment, or repeal
of statutes.87 The impact of these two statutes on the issue in question
88
has yet to be determined.
If the state recognizes a vested right as to unaccrued support
89
payments, Section 1.48 may prove determinative. If there is a vested
right as to such support payments, under Section 1.58 an argument
90
can be made that "under the prior operation of the statute," a "right,"
"privilege," or "obligation" was "previously acquired ... or incurred
thereunder," 91 such that a remedy or proceeding to enforce that privilege
92
Such an analysis will provide
or obligation may still be instituted.
85 See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
88 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1.48 (Page Supp. 1973).

87 The applicable provisions of OHIo REviSED CODE ANN. § 1.58 (Page Supp. 1973) are:
(A) The reenactment, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not, except as
provided in division (B) of this section:
(1) Affect the prior operation of the statute or any prior action taken
thereunder;
(2) Affect any validation, cure, right, privilege, obligation, or liability
previously acquired, accrued, accorded, or incurred thereunder;
(3) Affect any violation thereof or penalty, forfeiture, or punishment
incurred in respect thereto, prior to the amendment or repeal;
(4) Aflect any investigation, proceeding, or remedy in respect of any such
privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment; and the
investigation, proceeding, or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced,
and the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment imposed, as if the statute had not
been repealed or amended.
88 For a background understanding of the history of the enactment of these two
statutes and a working example of how they might be applied see Readey, Application
of the New Contractors Statute of Limitations Law, 45 OHio BAR 1515 (1972).
89 See Baker v. Baker, 80 Wash. 2d 736, 741, 498 P.2d 315, 318 (1972), where a
similar presumption was employed. But see Rosher v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 2d 556,
559, 71 P.2d 918, 919 (1937), where the statutory change was held prospective in
applying only to future payments.
90 OsIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.58(A) (1) (Page Supp. 1973).
91 Id. § 1.58(A) (2).
9 I1d. § 1.58(A) (4).
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domestic relations courts with continued jurisdiction to enforce support
orders entered without an agreement of the parents, and thereby reduce
the issue as to the effect of the recent statutory change to one of
construction of the decree itself.
The jurisdiction of the domestic relations courts to enforce decrees
based on an agreement of the parents is not based on or limited by the
age of majority. Ohio recognizes a significant effect on the court's
jurisdiction in the case of incorporation of a support agreement. In
Robrock v. Robrock,93 the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the
incorporation of an agreement between the parties to a divorce would
create an enforceable obligation beyond what the court could order
or enforce by itself.94 As such, the parties to a divorce can vest the
court with jurisdiction beyond the limits of the age of majority through
their agreements. Although it was once held that the contractual nature
95
this
of the agreement prevented a reduction in support payments,
96
position has been rejected.
In Istnick v. Istnick,97 the Common Pleas Court of Stark County
demonstrated that, in view of Robrock, the statutory change in the age of
majority will not affect the ability of domestic relations courts to enforce
98
decrees based on an incorporated agreement. The court enforced a
divorce decree based on an agreement which called for child support until
age 21, despite the subsequent reduction in the age of majority.
Under Robrock and Istnick, therefore, the effect of the statutory
reduction in the age of majority and the parental duty to support becomes
a question of how agreements incorporated into court decrees are to be
construed. The termination provisions of such decrees are invariably
99
placed in terms of such words as "until majority" or "until emancipated."
The experience of other states has shown that many decrees do not
even specify the termination date but merely state that the support is
for a "minor" child or the like. 100
The Istnick decision declared that the words in an incorporated
agreement relating to infancy would be given meaning, not under the law
at the time the agreement was made, but under whatever age the
93

Robrock v. Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479, 150 N.E.2d 421 (1958).

94 For a discussion of the Robrock decision see 11 STAN. L. REv. 366 (1959).
95 Tullis v. Tullis, 138 Ohio St. 187, 34 N.E.2d 212 (1941).
9e See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
97 Istnick v. Istnick, 37 Ohio Misc. 91, 307 N.E.2d 922 (Stark County C.P. 1973).
98 Id. at 93, 94, 307 N.E.2d at 924, 925.
99 The experience of the Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas,
Summit County, Ohio, has been that only one out of a hundred child support agreements does not provide for termination upon emancipation. Interview with Charles
E. Lowrey, Chief Referee, Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common
Pleas, Summit County, Ohio, January 17, 1975.
100 See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text,
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legislature should establish.'' Although such an approach is supported by
Rosher'0 2 and other states following that decision,103 in refusing to look to
the intent of the parties under the agreement at the time the agreement
was entered, the court rejects the equitable considerations on which the
Robrock decision was based:
It is entirely possible, perhaps probable, that a wife may be willing to
give up by way of agreement with her husband, much to which she
would be entitled in consideration of the husband doing more than
he might be required to do for their children. 10 4
Alimony agreements incorporated into decrees are usually not subject
to cour modification.105 The result of a removal of one parent's liability
for child support prior to what was contemplated by the parties, and
without a change in circumstances, makes the agreement no longer
meaningful and the property settlement unbalanced. 04
CONCLUSION

What one gains from an analysis of the decisions in other states
determining the rules for construction of support agreements incorporated
into divorce decrees is that the Jstnick rationale is not necessarily
compelling. There is strong support for the position that such decrees
should be construed according to the contract concept that the intent of
the parties should govern. Basic to such an approach is that the law at the
time the agreement is entered becomes part of the agreement. Under such
an approach "majority" means age 21, and the word "emancipation"
does not necessarily include emancipation by change of law.
Should the rights towards unaccrued payments be recognized as
vested against any subsequent legislative act, the construction of a decree,
whether based on an agreement of the parties or not, will become fixed
as of the date of the decree. The terms will gain their meaning as of
that date, disregarding subsequent legislative acts.
Under a development unique in our legal system, the parties to a
divorce can, through their agreement, create jurisdiction for a court to
enforce a decree calling for child support beyond the court's power to do
101 Istnick v. Istnick, 37 Ohio Misc. 91, 94, 307 N.E.2d 922, 925 (Stark County C.P.

1973).
102

See note 29 supra and accompanying text.

03

1

See note 51 supra and accompanying text.

104 Robrock v. Robrock, 167 Ohio St. 479,487, 150 N.E.2d 421, 427 (1958).
105 The general rule is that an alimony decree based upon the agreement of the parties
is not subject to court modification unless the decree reserves such authority or unless
there has been fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation. Newman v. Newman, 161 Ohio
St. 247, 118 N.E.2d 649 (1954); Law v. Law, 64 Ohio St. 369, 60 N.E. 560 (1901);
McClain v. McClain, 26 Ohio App. 2d 10, 268 N.E.2d 294 (1971); Pleasants v.
Pleasants, 27 Ohio App. 2d 191, 273 N.E.2d 339 (1971). But see Hunt v. Hunt, 169
Ohio St. 276, 159 N.E.2d 430 (1959).
10
e $ee Whitt v. Whitt, 490 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tenn. 1973) (Humphreys, J., dissenting).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 9

Winter, 1975]

COMMENT

so on its own. The jurisdiction to enforce divorce decrees is therefore
significantly affected by the nature and source of its provisions. If this
development was made to encourage parents to settle their differences by
mutual agreement, it would seem that the intent of the parties and other
contract principles should be the basis of the construction of the decree.
As to decrees imposed by the court without an agreement of
the parties, the enforceability of such decrees is directly dependent on the
parental duty of child support imposed by law. Yet even here the amount
and duration of child support reflects upon the property settlement
as a whole. There is something to be said in -favor of finality of
decrees subject only to a change in circumstances. College educations
can be planned. Incomes can be budgeted and anticipated with reasonable
certainty. Property settlements can be more balanced.
The writer finds the analysis and decisions of the state of Washington
convincing, although they represent a minority view on the subject. The
parties to a divorce are entitled to a certain degree of finality at the time
a decree is entered. The legislature retains the power to extend or limit
the parental duty of support by statute; yet not as to the particular
decree after it has been rendered. At that time rights and duties become
fixed subject only to a change of circumstances.
STEPHEN F. AmR
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